More Like Us?

More Like Us?

If the stakes for the individual at the center of the debate hadn’t been so deadly serious, watching the Bush Administration twisting in the wind over the case of Abdul Rahman would have been pure pleasure.

Rahman, you may recall, is the hapless Christian convert recently jailed and for a time facing a possible death sentence for apostasy under Afghanistan’s Islamic law. President Bush had come under mounting pressure from his conservative Christian allies to do something to save Mr. Rahman, and Bush had joined other Western leaders in pressuring the Afghan government to drop the case in the interests of freedom of religion.

The problem, of course, is that our cherished concept of ‘freedom of religion’ is enshrined nowhere in Afghanistan’s present constitution. Rather, after being “liberated” from the oppressive Taliban by the American invasion in late 2001, the new Afghan government quietly reasserted Islamic legal principles. And in the eyes of some Islamic clerics, the penalty for converting from Islam to another religion is death.

Once again, the Bush administration found itself on the horns of a dilemma largely of its own making. Through sheer hubris, the Bush administration downplayed the anticipated problems and consequences of its invasion of Afghanistan. In the process, the American public was sold a false “bill of goods” premised on the understanding that “They” (the people of Afghanistan) would be more like “Us” (Americans), if only given the chance. Unfortunately, the people of Afghanistan (and Iraq, for that matter) have not always played along.

When Bush first ran for president, he derided Clinton for his supposed efforts at “state-building” abroad. During the 2000 election campaign, Bush even famously rejected out of hand the notion that as President he ought to know much about the rest of the world, including the names of other world leaders. Ironically, the U.S. now finds itself involved in its most extensive efforts at state-building since Japan and Germany immediately after WWII, and yet from all appearances Bush still hasn’t mastered such essential knowledge about the world.

After four years, the Bush Administration still lacks a coherent and practical game plan. Instead, the Bush Administration seems to prefer state-building through bland platitudes and wishful thinking and the fine art of “muddling through.” In neither Iraq nor Afghanistan has the Bush Administration invested the sort of personnel and resources necessary to bring order out of these dysfunctional states. For them, it’s a matter of state-building on the cheap! And when our hand-picked allies refuse to follow the hopelessly optimistic script we wrote for them, the Bush Administration throws up its hands like a spoiled child and cries, “How could WE have known this would happen!” The American public, meanwhile, is once again left wondering just what we’re fighting for over there.

Well, it might have helped had the Bush Administration not been so self-servingly arrogant. It might have helped had the Neo-Cons managing our foreign policy consulted with the area specialists in the State Department, or academic experts on the Middle East and Islam, or at least deigned to talk with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq (as opposed to the sycophantic exiles they preferred). Any one of these groups could have pointed out the need for greater preparation and less unrestrained optimism on the part of the Bush Administration.

At base, as with so much else involving Bush, official policy seems ultimately based on faith (in all senses of the word). Hence the irony is that, as in the case of Abdul Rahman, it’s faith that has come back to bite the Bush Administration on the ass.

Peace!
Historian